Should Mariano Rivera be elected to the Hall of Fame?

What? Isn't that a forgone conclusion? Conventional wisdom? Isn't Mariano Rivera the greatest closer in history?

The premise here is that, although Rivera preformed his role very well, his role wasn't nearly as important as it was perceived during his career (1995-2013). Another way to look at it is that just a few years after Rivera retired, there seem to be many pitchers like Mariano Rivera and they seem to be on steroids, metaphorically speaking.

Rivera's best Strike Outs per 9 innings (SO9) (10.9) was in 1996 when Rivera was not a closer but the setup man to John Wetland. Rivera also pitched by far his most innings in 1996: 107. His second most innings was 80.66 in 2001 at age 31. His second best SO9 was 9.8 in 2008 at age 38.

Pitchers are part time performers and relief pitchers are part time pitchers, especially the closers. Excluding 2012 when Rivera was injured, in his 18 seasons Rivera pitched these innings these number of times:
>= 100  1 in 1996
90-99  0
80-89  1 in 2001
70-79  8
60-69  7
50-59  0
40-49  1 in 2002

Rivera topped 9 SO9 in six of his 18 seasons, only one third. 2008 was Rivera's best such season as a closer. Here are the tops in 2008 with at least 60 innings and zero starts.

Rk	Player	SO9	GS	IP	Year	Age	Tm	Lg	G	CG	SHO	GF	W	L	W-L%	SV	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	FIP	K%	BB%	ERA+	BAbip	HR	BF	AB	2B	3B	IBB	HBP	SH	SF	GDP	SB	CS	PO	BK	WP	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	OPS+	Pit	Str
1	Octavio Dotel	12.36	0	67.0	2008	34	CHW	AL	72	0	0	10	4	4	.500	1	52	34	28	29	92	3.76	4.24	31.9%	10.1%	122	.274	12	288	250	8	0	3	5	4	0	2	16	1	0	0	4	.208	.303	.384	.687	77	1179	744
2	Brad Lidge	11.94	0	69.1	2008	31	PHI	NL	72	0	0	61	2	0	1.000	41	50	17	15	35	92	1.95	2.41	31.5%	12.0%	224	.300	2	292	253	10	1	4	1	2	1	3	8	1	0	0	5	.198	.297	.269	.565	53	1238	759
3	Frank Francisco	11.79	0	63.1	2008	28	TEX	AL	58	0	0	18	3	5	.375	5	47	24	22	26	83	3.13	3.18	31.4%	9.9%	143	.270	7	264	235	10	3	2	0	0	3	0	7	1	0	0	5	.200	.277	.357	.634	67	1128	723
4	Brian Fuentes	11.78	0	62.2	2008	32	COL	NL	67	0	0	48	1	5	.167	30	47	22	19	22	82	2.73	2.24	32.0%	8.6%	172	.303	3	256	229	9	1	1	1	3	1	1	4	1	2	0	1	.205	.277	.293	.569	48	1116	718
5	Carlos Marmol	11.75	0	87.1	2008	25	CHC	NL	82	0	0	22	2	4	.333	7	40	30	26	41	114	2.68	3.62	32.8%	11.8%	171	.171	10	348	296	6	0	3	6	2	3	2	3	1	0	1	6	.135	.251	.257	.508	34	1512	930
6	Jonathan Broxton	11.48	0	69.0	2008	24	LAD	NL	70	0	0	32	3	5	.375	14	54	29	24	27	88	3.13	2.26	30.9%	9.5%	134	.321	2	285	249	10	2	5	3	3	3	6	10	3	0	0	3	.217	.298	.297	.595	62	1174	772
7	Kerry Wood	11.40	0	66.1	2008	31	CHC	NL	65	0	0	56	5	4	.556	34	54	24	24	18	84	3.26	2.32	30.4%	6.5%	141	.315	3	276	247	18	2	4	7	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	.219	.288	.344	.632	65	1076	722
8	Jose Valverde	10.38	0	72.0	2008	30	HOU	NL	74	0	0	71	6	3	.667	44	62	28	27	23	83	3.38	3.67	27.4%	7.6%	125	.281	10	303	276	12	3	6	2	0	2	0	8	0	0	2	3	.225	.287	.399	.686	86	1242	831
9	Matt Thornton	10.29	0	67.1	2008	31	CHW	AL	74	0	0	12	5	3	.625	1	48	20	20	19	77	2.67	2.75	28.7%	7.1%	172	.262	5	268	245	7	0	2	2	1	1	5	4	0	0	0	3	.196	.258	.286	.544	42	1040	700
10	Mike Adams	10.19	0	65.1	2008	29	SDP	NL	54	0	0	11	2	3	.400	0	49	18	18	19	74	2.48	3.13	28.6%	7.3%	153	.268	7	259	235	9	1	2	0	2	3	2	5	1	0	0	0	.209	.265	.345	.609	73	1014	670
11	Rafael Perez	10.14	0	76.1	2008	26	CLE	AL	73	0	0	14	4	4	.500	2	67	32	30	23	86	3.54	3.22	27.5%	7.4%	120	.307	8	313	286	8	1	3	2	2	0	10	2	3	0	0	3	.234	.296	.353	.649	73	1187	801
12	Francisco Rodriguez	10.14	0	68.1	2008	26	LAA	AL	76	0	0	69	2	3	.400	62	54	21	17	34	77	2.24	3.22	26.7%	11.8%	199	.294	4	288	250	13	0	4	2	1	1	5	8	0	0	0	6	.216	.314	.316	.630	67	1170	704
13	Jonathan Papelbon	10.00	0	69.1	2008	27	BOS	AL	67	0	0	62	5	4	.556	41	58	24	18	8	77	2.34	2.01	28.2%	2.9%	199	.300	4	273	260	12	0	0	0	4	1	3	2	0	1	0	2	.223	.245	.315	.561	43	1051	732
14	Francisco Cordero	9.98	0	70.1	2008	33	CIN	NL	72	0	0	63	5	4	.556	34	61	28	26	38	78	3.33	3.77	25.4%	12.4%	132	.307	6	307	260	9	1	3	3	3	3	5	7	3	1	0	3	.235	.336	.346	.682	83	1272	771
15	Joel Hanrahan	9.92	0	84.1	2008	26	WSN	NL	69	0	0	34	6	3	.667	9	73	40	37	42	93	3.95	3.84	25.6%	11.5%	109	.295	9	364	313	18	0	7	1	2	6	5	11	0	0	0	6	.233	.320	.377	.697	89	1481	907
16	Joe Nathan	9.84	0	67.2	2008	33	MIN	AL	68	0	0	57	1	2	.333	39	43	13	10	18	74	1.33	2.79	28.4%	6.9%	316	.236	5	261	240	7	1	4	2	1	0	7	5	0	0	0	2	.179	.242	.279	.521	41	1061	684
17	Damaso Marte	9.83	0	65.0	2008	33	TOT	ML	72	0	0	10	5	3	.625	5	52	29	29	26	71	4.02	3.24	26.1%	9.6%	107	.281	5	272	243	7	1	2	2	1	0	2	3	1	0	0	1	.214	.295	.313	.608	65	1115	707
18	Mariano Rivera	9.81	0	70.2	2008	38	NYY	AL	64	0	0	60	6	5	.545	39	41	11	11	6	77	1.40	2.03	29.7%	2.3%	316	.219	4	259	249	5	0	0	2	1	1	2	6	1	0	0	1	.165	.190	.233	.423	10	979	676

In 2016 32 relief pitchers had SO9 better than Rivera's best as a closer (9.8). 13 did better than Rivera's best when he was the setup man: 10.9.

Rk	Player	SO9	GS	IP	Year	Age	Tm	Lg	G	CG	SHO	GF	W	L	W-L%	SV	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	FIP	K%	BB%	ERA+	BAbip	HR	BF	AB	2B	3B	IBB	HBP	SH	SF	GDP	SB	CS	PO	BK	WP	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	OPS+	Pit	Str
1	Dellin Betances	15.53	0	73.0	2016	28	NYY	AL	73	0	0	20	3	6	.333	12	54	31	25	28	126	3.08	1.78	42.1%	9.4%	141	.355	5	299	268	11	0	0	1	1	1	4	21	0	0	0	6	.201	.279	.299	.577	55	1250	782
2	Andrew Miller	14.89	0	74.1	2016	31	TOT	AL	70	0	0	23	10	1	.909	12	42	13	12	9	123	1.45	1.68	44.7%	3.3%	310	.258	8	275	262	9	1	0	2	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	.160	.193	.294	.487	26	1118	785
3	Kyle Barraclough	14.00	0	72.2	2016	26	MIA	NL	75	0	0	6	6	3	.667	0	45	24	23	44	113	2.85	2.11	36.9%	14.4%	138	.306	1	306	256	9	2	1	2	2	2	2	9	2	0	0	8	.176	.299	.238	.538	54	1337	817
4	Ken Giles	13.98	0	65.2	2016	25	HOU	AL	69	0	0	24	2	5	.286	15	60	32	30	25	102	4.11	2.86	35.7%	8.7%	97	.354	8	286	256	13	3	1	2	2	1	0	5	0	0	0	14	.234	.306	.402	.709	94	1117	751
5	Kenley Jansen	13.63	0	68.2	2016	28	LAD	NL	71	0	0	63	3	2	.600	47	35	14	14	11	104	1.83	1.44	41.4%	4.4%	213	.244	4	251	234	8	2	2	2	3	1	1	4	1	0	0	1	.150	.194	.252	.446	24	1002	724
6	Michael Feliz	13.15	0	65.0	2016	23	HOU	AL	47	0	0	17	8	1	.889	0	55	33	32	22	95	4.43	3.24	35.2%	8.2%	90	.315	10	270	246	7	0	0	0	0	2	1	5	1	0	0	6	.224	.285	.374	.659	81	1148	720
7	Tyler Thornburg	12.09	0	67.0	2016	27	MIL	NL	67	0	0	23	8	5	.615	13	38	19	16	25	90	2.15	2.83	34.2%	9.5%	199	.229	6	263	235	11	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	4	.162	.247	.294	.541	47	1145	731
8	Seung-hwan Oh	11.64	0	79.2	2016	33	STL	NL	76	0	0	35	6	3	.667	19	55	20	17	18	103	1.92	2.13	32.9%	5.8%	214	.273	5	313	290	8	0	3	2	2	1	5	2	1	0	0	3	.190	.241	.269	.510	40	1305	873
9	Mychal Givens	11.57	0	74.2	2016	26	BAL	AL	66	0	0	8	8	2	.800	0	59	28	26	36	96	3.13	3.31	30.7%	11.5%	142	.317	6	313	268	14	0	2	6	2	1	6	7	4	0	0	3	.220	.325	.340	.664	77	1306	846
10	Cody Allen	11.51	0	68.0	2016	27	CLE	AL	67	0	0	55	3	5	.375	32	41	23	19	27	87	2.51	3.31	33.0%	10.2%	187	.237	8	264	232	8	1	2	0	3	2	7	2	3	0	0	3	.177	.261	.323	.584	49	1133	721
11	Hector Neris	11.43	0	80.1	2016	27	PHI	NL	79	0	0	13	4	4	.500	2	59	26	23	30	102	2.58	3.30	31.1%	9.2%	161	.273	9	328	292	11	1	3	3	1	2	4	6	0	0	1	4	.202	.281	.339	.620	72	1356	861
12	Brad Hand	11.18	0	89.1	2016	26	SDP	NL	82	0	0	16	4	4	.500	1	63	32	29	36	111	2.92	3.07	30.5%	9.9%	139	.267	8	364	323	12	1	4	1	2	2	6	11	2	1	0	7	.195	.276	.313	.589	63	1451	902
13	Ryan Buchter	11.14	0	63.0	2016	29	SDP	NL	67	0	0	10	3	0	1.000	1	34	20	20	31	78	2.86	3.07	31.6%	12.6%	142	.227	4	247	212	13	1	3	2	0	2	4	2	2	3	0	3	.160	.271	.288	.559	56	1127	677

The SO9 for Betances was about 50% better than the best for Rivera.

But there's more.

http://retrosheet.org/Research/SmithD/MythOfTheCloser.pdf

The Myth of the Closer
By David W. Smith
Presented July 29, 2016
SABR46, Miami, Florida

Every team spends much effort and money to select its closer, the pitcher who enters in the ninth inning to seal the deal and nail down a win. Of course, this now universal use of a closer only became the norm relatively recently and the reason given is simple: teams feel their chance of winning is increased by having this ace specialist. I decided to look at this assumption more closely and came to a probably startling conclusion: it isn’t true that closers increase the chance for a team to win, or at least it is marginally true at best...

Others have addressed the use of closers: Bill James suggests that using an ace in the 7th inning in a crucial situation may be more important; I agree. Mike Emeigh believes that closers are more important in extra innings. Wayne Towers has a presentation tomorrow afternoon on the possible changing meaning of high save totals.

Conclusions

1. The entry of a new pitcher to start the 9th inning has increased dramatically since 1980.

2. The presence of this new pitcher has had almost no effect on a team’s chances to win.

3. Ace closers bring slightly more wins than other 9th inning pitchers (92% vs 88%)

4. Performance of 9th inning pitchers is almost indistinguishable between closers and others.

5. Increased use 9th inning pitchers correlates with overall increase of relief pitchers.

6. Pitchers have had progressively shorter stints for over 100 years.

7. Current pattern of closer usage is not justified by their contributions to team wins.

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Radical Baseball Wednesday, February 20, 2008

By

Kenneth Matinale

June 9, 2006

1. Start the closer.

Last night the Yanks were leading the Red Sox 3-2 in the sixth, bases loaded, no outs. Starter Jaret Wright was done. With the game on the line manager Joe Torre called for not his best relief pitcher, Mariano Rivera, but his third best (at best) Scott Proctor.  Proctor did an OK job allowing two of Wright’s runs to score. Unfortunately, in the next inning Proctor allowed three of his own.

Torre should have brought in Mariano Rivera, his best. Since Tony LaRussa created this nonsense called the closer with his use of Dennis Eckersley in the late 1980s, managers have adhered to this formula like their jobs depended on it. Part of the orthodoxy is: who will pitch the ninth inning? The closer is used almost exclusively to pitch one and only one inning, which he starts, and only with a lead. Save the game in the sixth and take your chances in the ninth. Is Scott Proctor more likely to allow runs entering a game with bases loaded and no out or when starting an inning?

This brings up another piece of nonsense. The closer is the only pitcher who probably will not need to pitch with runners on base. Why doesn’t he wind up? The starter is the only pitcher who winds up, yet he is the most likely to pitch with runners on base because he pitches the most innings. About 25 years ago people realized that relief pitchers often pitched with runners on base, so relievers abandoned the wind up. But the closer could and probably should wind up. How come nobody has realized that? It’s pretty simple.

In another recent game Torre announced before the game that he would pitch Rivera no matter what because Rivera needed work. Aside from the silliness that a pitcher needs to play catch in a game rather than just do it on the sideline (hey, it’s nothing like a batter needing to face game pitching), why wait until Rivera’s usual time in the ninth? Start him! Here are three advantages:

1. Rivera pitches to the top of the order. The batters in the ninth are random. Rivera is as likely to face the bottom of the order as the top. Pitch Scott Proctor against the bottom.
2. In the first inning the game is almost always close. Always at home. On the road it might not be close if the closer’s team scores a bunch in the top of the first inning.
3. Rivera can pitch more than one inning. If Rivera retires the side in the first inning on six pitches, he did not get the work that Torre wanted. However, Rivera can pitch at least one more inning. If Torre waits until the ninth inning, Rivera may throw those six pitches, get little work and Torre may have already used Scott Proctor for an inning or two when he may have avoided using Proctor at all. Let pitch count dictate how long Rivera works, not the arbitrary wall of the ninth inning. You know, like they do for starters.

Rivera pitches in about 70 games and throws about 80 innings in a season. Why not start him every other game? He would get regular rest and the three advantages listed above would apply in every appearance. I’ll bet that Rivera’s contribution to the Yanks winning would be at least as great as it is with Torre blindly following the formula. OK, now it’s time for you to run around and scream: he blasphemes!

___________________________

Thinking Man's Guide to Managing a Pitching Staff Wednesday, February 20, 2008

by
Kenneth Matinale
December 10, 2007

... the Tony LaRussa orthodoxy of designating his best relief pitcher as the closer. The closer is used almost exclusively to pitch one and only one inning (the ninth), which he starts, and only with a lead. The set up man is the second best relief pitcher who pitches only the eighth inning. The set up man is removed no matter how many pitches he threw and no matter how well he pitched. It's like Russian roulette, looking for the pitcher who does not have his good stuff that day.

This is exactly backwards ...

Outs are the currency of baseball. Since pitchers are on pitch counts, pitches are the currency of individual pitchers. The manager should attempt to get the optimum number of pitches from each pitcher in each game constrained only by the game situation and the needs of the long 162 game regular season...

The best relief pitcher available should be the first to enter the game. The second best relief pitcher available should be the second to enter the game. And so on...

The reason for using Mariano Rivera, the Yankees best relief pitcher, first is to get the maximum number of pitches from him in that particular game. If Girardi waits until the ninth inning, Rivera may retire the side on six pitches when he could have thrown 24. Twenty-four pitches may have equated to two or even three innings thus eliminating the dreaded middle inning relievers, the worst pitchers on the staff. Not waiting until the ninth inning also allows Girardi to use Rivera in a game saving situation: bases loaded, sixth inning, cleanup hitter at bat. Waiting until the ninth deprives Girardi of discretion as to which batters Rivera faces. The bottom of the order is as likely to bat in the ninth as the top of the order.

Using this technique the pitchers most likely to be short changed, i.e., throw the fewest pitches, are the worst pitchers, not the best as is the case now. Each succeeding pitcher in order of value is increasingly more likely to throw fewer pitches...

If Joe Girardi does anything like this he will be different from Joe Torre. Otherwise he is like all the other MLB managers.
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